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COMMENTS




by Michael D. Wortley
There are now professional groups that engage in the business of training
persons to render first aid. Potential trainees include the common carrier
("carrier") employees who must deal with passengers becoming sick en
route. These professional training groups encourage carriers to undertake
such training as a service to their passengers and for the advertising value to
the carrier of such training. Placing aside the potential value of public
service and good will which might emanate from first aid training programs,
this Comment explores the extent of the liability for negligence which a
carrier might incur by rendering first aid following participation in such
programs. I To analyze the potential liability, several legal aspects of liability
must be examined: the degree of care owed to passengers; the duty to render
aid; and any liability exemption mechanisms.
This Comment contends that common carriers, despite owing a duty of a
high degree of care in transporting and setting down passengers,2 are not
under any duty3 to render first aid to passengers. This position is in direct
conflict with the Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that a common
carrier is under a duty to give first aid to ill passengers.4 Without a duty to
render first aid, common carriers that do undertake to render first aid to sick
passengers should be exempt from liability for ordinary negligence5 in ren-
dering such aid through two legal mechanisms: Good Samaritan statutes and
releases from liability signed by passengers prior to boarding the vehicle.
The legal efficacy of these two mechanisms is so uncertain,6 however, that
1. Although the employees of a carrier would actually render the first aid, this Comment
assumes that carrier liability would be determined by general agency principles. See generally
W. SELL, AGENCY (1975).
2. Little v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 94 Cal. App. 303, 271 P. 134 (1928). For further
discussion see cases cited in 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 677 (1939).
3. The word "duty" means that the person who is sought to be held liable is under a legal
requirement to have done or not to have done an act which would have prevented the injury in
question. Steuer, The Conception of Duty in Personal Injury Cases in New York, 18 CORNELL
L.Q. 51 (1932). Where there is no legal duty, there can be no negligence, and consequently no
liability for action or inaction. Webb v. City of Lubbock, 380 S.W.2d 135, 136 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thompson v. Graham, 333 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Wichita Falls v. Swartz, 57 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(l)(b) (1965).
5. Throughout this Comment "negligence" and "ordinary negligence" are used inter-
changeably but are distinguished from "gross negligence" or "reckless conduct." See notes
125-30 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 78-165 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the proposition that the
principal uncertainty in the area of the application of Good Samaritan statutes and exemptions
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reliance on either is not recommended. A carrier's attempt to avoid liability
for negligence in rendering first aid should be directed towards amending the
current Good Samaritan statutes. Until some statutory protection is afford-
ed, carriers are urged to proceed cautiously, if at all, in training their
employees to render first aid.
As the term "first aid" often is used rather loosely, its parameters must be
defined. The analysis below focuses on the legal aspects of carrier liability
for negligence of its employees in rendering first aid after formal training7 in
such aid. The basic elements of first-aid training would include, inter alia,
maintenance and restoration of breathing, control of bleeding, administra-
tion of oxgyen, bandaging and splinting, and treatment of unconsciousness.8
The present state of the law unnecessarily inhibits such formal first-aid
training to the disadvantage of passengers who suddenly become ill.
By way of further delineating the scope of this discussion, it should be
noted that the liability concerned with is the liability for rendering first aid
negligently to a passenger who becomes ill through no fault of the carrier or
its employees. Also, the assumption is made that the carrier has had no
notice of illness until the vehicle is underway.
I. BACKGROUND
Common Carrier. The definition of a common carrier 9 includes not only
railroads, buses, and airplanes, but also such diverse "vehicles" as es-
calators and elevators, ° taxis, 1 street cars, 2 and ski lifts. 3 With such a
variety of modes of common carrier transportation available, 4 the question
of liability in rendering first aid negligently to ill passengers is a significant
one. Only airlines presently provide a formal first aid training program for
their personnel.' 5 The question is whether the other carriers should follow
the trend of the airlines by preparing their employees to render first aid to ill
passengers.
Common Law. According to the common law rule of rescue, if there is no
contractual relation between two persons, there is no duty on the part of one
from liability to carriers that render first aid results from the fifty states deciding the issue as a
matter of first impression. Consequently, divergence in interpretation is probable.
7. Frequently, the term "first aid" is used to mean any immediate assistance given during
a sudden illness by a bystander or other lay person before the arrival of persons formally
trained to render aid. Miles, Aspects of Emergancy Care: First-aid Training, 4 BRIT. MED. J.
485 (1969).
8. Id. at 486.
9. A common carrier has been defined as one who carries passengers indiscriminately
(invites the public) for consideration. See Note, Negligence-Store Escalators as "Common
Carrier," 8 B.U.L. REV. 162 (1928).
10. id.
II. See, e.g., Taylor v. Luxor Cab Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 46, 246 P.2d 45 (1952).
12. See, e.g., Finley v. City & County of San Francisco, 115 Cal. App. 2d 116,251 P.2d 687
(1952).
13. See, e.g., Grauer v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 471, 181 N.Y.S.2d 994, aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 829,
192 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959). The New York Legislature subsequently defined ski lifts not to be
common carriers. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 2(9) (McKinney 1965).
14. This Comment will not discuss maritime carriers since the law of negligence has been
pre-empted by federal legislation and is a unique closed system inapplicable to land and air
carriers. See 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
15. Telephone interview with Ronny Verbus, Director of Flight Attendant Training, Ameri-
can Airlines, in Dallas, Texas, Aug. 18, 1976.
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person to rescue or assist another person in peril or distress.'6 Although the
common law developed techniques to encourage bystanders to rescue, 17 the
law simultaneously deterred rescue by its mandate that once the rescue
operation begins the rescuer is under a duty to use reasonable care in
effecting the rescue. 8 Under the common law rescue doctrine, the legal duty
to use reasonable care is imposed only when one citizen voluntarily attempts
to aid another; 19 however, prior to the voluntary aid, there is no legal duty to
aid those in peril.20 Against this background, Good Samaritan statutes,
protecting the volunteer, were enacted."'
II. DUTY OF COMMON CARRIERS TO RENDER FIRST AID
The analysis of the duty, if one exists, of a carrier to render first aid is
complicated by the fact that a duty may arise out of (1) a relation between a
carrier and its passengers,2" (2) a contract between the parties, 23 or (3) a state
or federal statute. 24 Examination of these three potential sources of a duty to
render first aid is necessary before determining whether common carriers
may avoid liability for negligence in rendering first aid, since the application
of the two liability exemption mechanisms, Good Samaritan statutes and
releases, is predicated upon the absence of a duty to render aid. Before
these potential sources are analyzed, however, the standard of care general-
ly required of a carrier is compared with the standard of care required when
passengers become ill.
A. Standard of Care of Common Carrier Generally Required
That common carriers owe passengers the duty to exercise the highest
degree of care25 in the operation of the conveyance26 and in the boarding and
alighting of passengers 27 is a well-settled rule. Although this affirmative duty
16. See, e.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928) (defendant who failed to
respond to intestate's cries for help over a half-hour period infringed no legal right of intestate).
See also Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); Griswold v. Boston & Me. R.R., 183
Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354 (1903); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); Note, Duty to
Assist Person in Peril, 12 MINN. L. REv. 765 (1928).
17. These techniques include allowing injured rescuers to recover, Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 232
N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), and an unwillingness to find that a rescuer has been contributori-
ly negligent, Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
18. See, e.g., Devlin v. Safeway Stores, 235 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Franklin,
Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52 (1972).
19. See United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962); Nelson v. Chicago M., St. P.
& Pac. Ry., 252 Wis. 585, 32 N.W.2d 340 (1948); Note, The Duty to Aid One in Peril: Good
Samaritan Laws, 15 How. L.J. 672, 673 (1969).
20. Gordon, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine of Rescue, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 334(1965); Comment, The Good Samaritan and the Law, 32 TENN. L. REV. 288 (1965).
21. See notes 78-130 infra and accompanying text.
22. Comment, Duty of a Railway Company to Care for a Person It Has Without Fault
Rendered Helpless, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 312 (1919).
23. See Steuer, supra note 3, at 51.
24. Id.
25. Ortiz v. Greyhound Corp., 275 F.2d 770, 773 (4th Cir. 1960); Doss v. Southwestern
Transp. Co., 89 S.W.2d 1092, 1093 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref'd); Bragg v.
Houston Elec. Co., 264 S.W. 245, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1924), aff'd, 276 S.W. 641
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Note, Negligence-Common Carriers-Degrees of
Care, 39 N.C.L. REV. 294, 295 n.5 (1961).
26. Little v. Los Angeles Ry., 94 Cal. App. 303, 271 P. 134 (1928). For a further discussion
see cases cited in 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 677 (1939).
27. 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 677 (1939).
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has been expressed in a variety of ways,28 courts agree that the carrier is not
an absolute insurer of the safety of a passenger.29 In contrast to this duty of a
high degree of care in the transportation of passengers is the lower standard
of care required when passengers become ill. Without exception, the fifteen
states and three federal courts applying state law which have considered the
scope of a carrier's duty to a sick passenger have held that the duty owed is
to provide reasonable care under the circumstances. 30 As none of the cir-
cumstances in these cases involved the rendering of first aid, the question is
reduced to whether the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances includes a duty to render first aid with reasonable care.
B. Possible Sources of the Duty to Render First Aid
Relation Between Carrier and Passenger. Certain relations give rise to
duties that are not dependent upon a contract between the parties. 3' The
relation between a carrier and its passengers is an excellent example of a
relation which generates duties independent of the contract of carriage. As
explained by the Supreme Court of Texas,32 the relation of a passenger and
carrier is created by contract, 33 but the common law, not the contract, has
attached duties to the relation34 because of the public concern for safe
transportation. Safety of passenger travel is a matter of public policy and
cannot be left to individual contract between carrier and passenger. 35 This
public policy aspect may so affect the relation between carrier and passen-
ger as to create a duty to render first aid.
Carriers are clearly under a general duty to provide reasonable care and
attention to sick passengers.3 6 In addition, several courts have held that a
carrier is under a duty of reasonable care to secure medical assistance for an
ill passenger. For example, in Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad,37
where the conductor of defendant's train knew that a passenger was serious-
ly ill, the court held that the conductor acted reasonably in arranging for the
28. Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 106 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.S.C. 1952) ("the highest
degree of practical care in the circumstances"); St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. v. Gore, 69 S.W.2d
186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1934, writ dism'd) ("a high degree of care"); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v.
Adams, 163 S.W. 1029, 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, writ ref'd) (the care of "a very
cautious and prudent person"). See also Note, Torts-Negligence-Common Carriers-Degree
of Care Owed Passengers, 17 N.C.L. REV. 453 (1939).
29. Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Alsup, 101 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1939).
30. See, e.g., Continental S. Lines, Inc. v. Robertson, 241 Miss. 796, 133 So. 2d 543 (1961).
For further general discussion see cases cited in Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 656, 659 (1963). The
courts do not impose the highest degree of care because illness, unlike the conveyance of
passengers, is not within the control of the carrier.
31. Winn v. Holmes, 143 Cal. App. 2d 501, 299 P.2d 994 (1956) (public/visitor relation);
McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573 (1943) (innkeeper/guest
relation).
32. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. McGown, 65 Tex. 640 (1886).
33. Id. at 646.
34. Id. The court said:
These duties attach as a matter of law, and without regard to the will or wish of
the .. .person who transacts business with him .. .and this is so, for the
public good. Duties thus imposed are not the subject of contract . . . .The
violation of the duty is a tort. The law declares that it is the duty of a public
carrier of passengers to use the highest degree of care, to insure their safety.
35. Id.
36. Jacob v. Pennsylvania R.R., 203 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1953); Middleton v. Whitridge, 213
N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Salzman, 52 Ohio St. 558, 40 N.E.
891 (1895).
37. 106 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
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removal of the passenger from the train and delivering the passenger to a
doctor. In Jacob v. Pennsylvania Railroad38 the court held that when the
carrier's employee knows that a passenger is ill, a duty exists to remove the
passenger from the train, if practicable, and to place him under medical
care. Thus, in Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Robertson39 a bus com-
pany was held liable for a bus driver's failure to secure medical attention for
a passenger who, through no fault of the carrier, had injured her knee while
on the bus.4 °
Although a carrier appears to be under a duty to secure medical assist-
ance, when practicable, for a passenger who becomes ill, no case has held
that the carrier itself must provide medical services. 41 In fact, some cases
have expressly stated that a carrier is under no duty to turn its vehicles into
hospitals or its employees into nurses. 42 Moreover, a carrier's employees are
not empowered to diagnose an illness. In Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line
Railroad43 the train conductor, knowing the plaintiff was ill, was under a
duty to render extra care and attention to the passenger and to arrange for a
doctor. In finding no negligence for removing the passenger from the train,
however, the court noted that the conductor could not, and properly did not,
attempt to diagnose the illness. 44 In Middleton v. Whitridge45 a street car
conductor was found negligent for failing to secure medical aid for a passen-
ger he believed to be drunk but who in reality was suffering from a stroke.
The court stated that "[t]he fault of the conductor was not in making a
wrong diagnosis, but in rashly assuming that he was competent to make any
diagnosis at all. '' 46
Case law, therefore, indicates a duty of reasonable care to secure medical
aid for sick passengers and to give special attention to sick passengers.
There is, however, no duty on the part of a carrier or its employees actually
to render medical aid or attempt to diagnose the problem.
It is within this framework that the Restatement (Second). of Torts §
314A(1)(b) must be tested. 47 Middleton v. Whitridge48 is the primary authori-
38. 203 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1953).
39. 241 Miss. 796, 133 So. 2d 543 (1961).
40. See also Korn v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 510, 133 S.E.2d 616 (1963);
Hughes v. Gregory Bus Lines, Inc., 157 Miss. 374, 128 So. 96 (1930); San Antonio Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Wellman, 288 S.W. 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ).
41. Cases have arisen where an injured passenger of a common carrier apparently had the
opportunity to sue the carrier for negligence in failing to provide first-aid services. For example,
in Grauer v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 471, 181 N.Y.S.2d 994, aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 829, 192 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1959), plaintiff was injured by a chair lift operated by the state as a "common carrier." The
court noted that the state had not furnished a first-aid station, but negligence was not predicated
on that fact.
42. Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 106 F. Supp. 886, 890 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Korn v.
Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 510, 133 S.E.2d 616, 621 (1963).
43. 106 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
44. Id. at 889-90.
45. 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915).
46. 108 N.E. at 197. The danger involved in trying to diagnose illnesses has been recognized
by the airlines. Flight attendants are carefully trained to treat symptoms (choking, unconscious-
ness, chest pain, etc.), and never to diagnose the problem. No medicine may be given by a flight
attendant, even if a passenger requests the flight attendant to give him his own medicine, and
oxygen and smelling salts are the only stimulants that may be used. No mechanical equipment
(e.g., tourniquets) is used other than temporary splints and slings. Interview with Lucky
Kroney, former flight attendant trainer for American Airlines, in Dallas, Texas, Aug. 2, 1976.
47. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
48. 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915).
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ty used by the Restatement to support the proposition that a common carrier
is under a duty "to give" passengers first aid after the carrier knows or has
reason to know that a passenger is ill or injured. In expressing the duty the
conductor owes to a passenger who becomes ill, the court said "it was [the
carrier's] duty, if practicable, to remove [the ill passenger] and put him in
custody of an officer or someone who could look after him."'49 There is no
language in the case that says a carrier is under a duty to render first aid. In
the subsequent retrial of the same case50 the lower court interpreted the New
York court of appeals' standard by finding that the court of appeals had held
only that a conductor must use reasonable care, upon discovering an appa-
rent illness, to determine that the passenger is in the need of medical
attention; if it is known or reasonably should have been known that the
passenger is too ill to remain in the car, then it is the duty of the carrier to
remove the passenger and put him in custody of an officer. 5' Thus, Middle-
ton does not support the Restatement's assertion that there is a duty to
render first aid.52 The extent of the duty seems to be to provide a passenger
with care and comfort as reasonably practicable under the circumstances
and to get the passenger to a place where competent medical aid is avail-
able.5 3 No case has extended the duty to demand that carriers formally train
their employees to render first aid.
The fact that no case has ever held that a carrier is under a duty to render
first aid to sick passengers is not surprising. The carrier holds itself out to
the public as having expertise in the operation of the vehicle, and for this
reason the carrier must exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of
passengers in such operation.5 4 When, however, a passenger suddenly be-
comes ill, the carrier's employee is no different from the other passengers in
that he is a layman with regard to the infirmities of passengers. 55 To force
upon a carrier a duty which is unrelated to its expertise and undertaken task,
the safe conveyance of passengers, would be unreasonable. Even the cases
which impose the highest degree of care on a carrier in the operation of its
49. 108 N.E. at 197.
50. Middleton v. Third Ave. Ry., 192 App. Div. 172, 182 N.Y.S. 598 (1920).
51. 182 N.Y.S. at 600.
52. The other three cases cited as authority by the Restatement also are not on point. In Yu
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958), defendant carrier was found
negligent for injuries suffered while alighting from defendant's train by plaintiff who walked
with a limp. The surrounding circumstances were such that the carrier's duty to guard passen-
gers against all dangers which might reasonably be expected to occur required the carrier to
assist the passenger in alighting. The case, however, had nothing whatsoever to do with a duty
to render first aid. In Jones v. New York Cent. R.R., 4 App. Div. 2d 967, 168 N.Y.S.2d 927
(1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 963, 152 N.E.2d 519, 177 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1958), the passenger recovered
damages for injuries sustained by him when he attempted to jump aboard defendant's train.
Again, there was no mention of a duty to render first aid. Finally, in Kambour v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 77 N.H. 33, 86 A. 624 (1913), defendant railroad was found negligent for knowingly
permitting plaintiff, a 14-year-old boy, to jump off the train. Again, no issue of a carrier's duty
to render first aid was before the court.
53. McCann v. Newark & S.O. Ry., 58 N.J.L. 642, 34 A. 1052 (1896); 2 R. HUTCHINSON,
LAW OF CARRIERS § 992 (1906).
54. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Burris, 309 Ky. 150, 216 S.W.2d 920 (1949); South-
eastern Greyhound Lines v. Davis, 290 Ky. 362, 160 S.W.2d 625 (1942).
55. Gray v. Seattle, 29 Wash. 2d 428, 187 P.2d 310 (1947).
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vehicles impose such care only when the dangerous condition giving rise to
the injury was one capable of control by the carrier. 56 Certainly, the carrier
has no control over a passenger's illness and cannot prevent the illness even
by exercising the highest degree of care.57 Thus, to place a duty upon the
carrier to render first aid would not seem to be in accord with the policies
underlying the imposition of a high degree of care in the transportation of
passengers. The finding of a duty to secure aid is as far as the courts have
gone in an area which is totally outside the control of the carrier, despite the
Restatement's failure to make the critical distinction between rendering and
securing first aid.
Contractual Duty. A second possible source of a duty of a carrier to
render first aid is the contract of carriage between the carrier and pas-
senger.58 A contract of carriage implies that the carrier will use the highest
degree of care and diligence in transporting the passenger to his destination
safely.5 9 The source of the contractual duty is mutual consent of the parties,
either expressed or implied. 6° Besides the duty to carry safely,6 the contract
of carriage has been held to create the duty to protect passengers from
personal violence, 62 and to provide medical treatment to an injured passen-
ger where a doctor was available and the passenger requested such treat-
ment. 63 On the other hand, Hanlon v. Central Railroad' held that the
contract of carriage did not impose a duty upon the carrier to furnish a
passenger personal assistance in leaving the railroad car. 65 The court found
negligence on the part of the conductor, but this negligence was predicated
56. Bragg v. Houston Elec. Co., 264 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1924), aff'd,
276 S.W. 641 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted) (carrier under duty to keep aisle free of
baggage).
57. In Davis v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 113 N.J.L. 427, 174 A. 540 (1934), the
court said that a common carrier is under a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to protect
passengers from dangers that foresight could predict. But in explaining "foresight" and duty of
care the court said "[bly 'foresight' is meant, not foreknowledge absolute, nor that exactly such
an accident as has happened was expected or apprehended; but rather that the characteristics of
the accident are such that it can be classified among events that, without due care, are likely to
occur, and that due care would prevent." 174 A. at 541. Due care will not prevent a passenger's
illness.
58. Courts have long recognized that a contract can create a legal duty to perform work in a
non-negligent manner. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 234 N.C. 512, 67 S.E.2d 492 (1951). See also
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 204 S.W.2d 508 (1947); Palestine
Contractors, Inc. v. Roach, 517 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ dism'd); Exxon
Corp. v. Butler Drilling Co., 508 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 So. 456 (1901); Clark v. Tarr, 75
Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954); Prospert v. Rhode Island Suburban Ry., 28 R.I. 367, 67 A. 522
(1907). For further general discussion see 14 AM. JUR. 2d Carriers § 737 (1964).
60. Note, Negligence-Duty-Creation of Duty by Contract, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 216, 217
(1954).
61. Note, Torts-Breach of Contractual Duty as Negligence, 34 N.C.L. REV. 253, 256
(1956); see note 59 supra.
62. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 So. 456 (1901).
63. The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397 (9th Cir. 1918).
64. 187 N.Y. 73, 79 N.E. 846 (1907).
65. The court, finding that the contract of carriage did, however, impose certain duties,
stated that "[t]he contract implied the supply of proper agencies for its performance, in engines
and cars for conveyance and in engineers, conductors, and brakemen to control and regulate
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
solely on the fact that once he did volunteer to assist the passenger, he was
under a duty to use reasonable care.
66
No case has ever directly addressed the question of whether a duty to
render first aid is implied from the contract of carriage. As the tort remedy
has advantages over the contract remedy, 67 the issue probably will not arise.
It is probable, however, that a court would find an implied promise to render
first aid in the contract 68 if the carrier had formally trained its drivers or
other employees to render first aid, especially if that fact were publicized as
part of the carrier's service to its passengers.
Statutory Duty. A third potential source of the duty of a carrier to render
first aid is that of statutes or ordiances. Generally an act or failure to act in
accordance with a statutory standard is negligence as a matter of law. 69 No
statute or ordiance has been found, either federal, state, or local, that
requires carriers to train their employees to render first aid. This writer
believes, however, that a source of the duty to render first aid for the
airlines is found in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,70 which imposes a duty
upon an air carrier to operate with the highest degree of care and safety, 7'
and creates a cause of action in favor of the injured party.72 The Act itself
the movements of the train . . . .It was not bound to furnish her any personal assistance in
leaving the car, for she was . . . in the possession of her faculties and of good health, and was
capable of moving about alone." Id.
66. Id. at 847. This is the same type of analysis which is applied to the bystander who
voluntarily attempts to aid a person in distress-absent a contractual relation one person is
under no duty to aid another in distress, but once aid is rendered it must be undertaken with
reasonable care. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
67. First, if the plaintiff-passenger can show that he received the injury without fault on his
part from an instrument or appliance under the control of the carrier, then the plaintiff has
presented a prima facie case. See, e.g., Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 399, 45
S.E.2d 546 (1947). Secondly, a tort action generally will allow greater recovery for the passen-
ger. Breach of contract damages are tempered by the requirement that they be reasonably
within the comtemplation of the parties at the time the contract is made. See, e.g., Perkins v.
Langdon, 237 N.C. 159, 74 S.E.2d 634 (1953). In an action for tort, however, the plaintiff is
allowed to recover damages for all injuries sustained irrespective of the parties' intent. See,
e.g., Mintz v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 607, 65 S.E.2d 120 (1951). Additionally,
damages for mental anguish may be recovered in certain tort actions, while such recovery in a
breach of contract action is unusual. Compare Britt v. N. Carolina R.R., 148 N.C. 37, 61 S.E.
601 (1908), with Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949).
68. Ironically, Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915), the case cited as
the primary authority for the proposition in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)
that carriers are under a duty to render first aid, is grounded in contract, not tort, theory. The
court explained that the duty to secure aid for sick passengers "springs from the contract to
carry safely." 108 N.E. at 197. Only one more step is required for a court to hold that a carrier
employee has a duty to render first aid which also "springs from the contract to carry safely."
69. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947) (statute);
Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1948) (ordinance). In stating the
reasoning behind negligence per se, Mr. Justice Cardozo said that "[bly the very terms of the
hypothesis, to omit, wilfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of
another that he may be preserved in life or limb, is to fall short of the standard of diligence to
which those who live in organized society are under a duty to conform." Martin v. Herzog, 228
N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920). See also Kennedy, Safety Statutes and Ordinances-Their
Application and Construction, 19 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 323 (1975); Note, Negligence-Actions-
Violation of Statute or Ordinance, 26 J.B.A. KAN. 118 (1957).
70. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970); see Note, The Applicability of Federal Common Law to
Aviation Tort Litigation, 63 GEO. L.J. 1083 (1975).
71. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F..Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
72. Id. at 614-15. Whether a federal common law remedy exists or individual state remedies
in tort exist is arguable, but the important point is the creation of a duty by the federal statute.
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does not specifically demand first aid training for airline employees, but the
Act does impose a duty on the Federal Aviation Administrator to issue
regulations to implement the Act. 73 Pursuant to this mandate, the Adminis-
trator has issued regulations pertaining to crew member emergency train-
ing74 which require instruction in the use of first aid equipment 75 and in
handling of illness or injury of passengers. 76
No case has been reported which construes the emergency training regula-
tions in the first aid context. The breach of other Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, however, is negligence per se. 77 Thus, it is likely that a court presented
with the issue would hold that there is an affirmative duty on the airlines to
render first aid to passengers, and any breach of this duty would establish
negligence per se.
III. EXEMPTION OF COMMON CARRIERS FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
IN RENDERING FIRST AID: Two MECHANISMS
A. Good Samaritan Statutes
General. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
form of a Good Samaritan statute. 78 These statutes exempt the volunteer
from tort liability for ordinary negligence in rendering emergency aid to one
in peril. 79 The rationale for the statutes stems from an accommodation of the
common law's refusal to recognize a legal duty of a bystander to assist a
stranger in peril8" and the requirement that once voluntary aid has begun
reasonable care must be exercised.8 These statutes are premised on the
belief that by removing the fear of liability for negligence, doctors, nurses,
and laymen will be encouraged to aid persons who are in need of assist-
ance.
82
See Note, supra note 70, at 1108. Common law remedies have not been abridged. 49 U.S.C. §
1506 (1970). A common carrier owes the highest degree of care with respect to the operation and
maintenance of the vehicle and equipment, and such duty has not been changed by the Federal
Aviation Act; state common law is still applicable. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209
Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
73. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1970); see Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968).
74. 14 C.F.R. § 121.417 (1977).
75. Id. § 121.417(b)(2)(ii).
76. Id. § 121.417(b)(3)(iv).
77. Pilgrim Aviation & Airlines, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. L. REP. (CCH)
17,458 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (failure to determine whether the aircraft was in safe condition for flight
violated an FAA regulation and constituted negligence per se).
78. See notes 86-87 infra for the citation to the statutes. No source has made a complete
compilation of the statutes.
79. See generally Weigel, Texas Law and Emergency Medicine, 15 S. TEX. L.J. 133 (1974);
Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964);
Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and A Proposal, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 418 (1964-65).
80. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text. See also 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 21.35 (1975).
81. As Dean Prosser stated, "[t]he result of all this is that the Good Samaritan who tries to
help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the
other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing. It has been pointed out often enough that this in
fact operates as a real, and serious, deterrent to the giving of needed aid." W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 344 (4th ed. 1971).
82. The need for Good Samaritan statutes has been attacked on several fronts. First, no
reported case has reached the appellate level of any court in the United States where a doctor or
layman has been sued for rendering emergency aid. Heck, Emergency Care and Good Samari-
tan Legislation, 68 J. KAN. MED. SOC'Y 15, 16 (1967); Note, The Not-So-Good Samaritan
Laws, 270 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003 (1964). In fact, a commission convened to examine the
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Early statutes8 3 protected only physicians, nurses, and other medical or
rescue personnel such as firemen, policemen, rescue squad members, and
ambulance drivers,84 but later statutes were broadened to protect any person
from liability for ordinary negligence in rendering emergency aid . 5 Current-
ly, nineteen states and the District of Columbia protect only physicians and
other licensed medical personnel,86 while the remaining thirty-one states
protect everyone from such liability.87 The following discussion pertains to
only this latter group of statutes which have possible application to the
employees of common carriers who render first aid to ill passengers.
88
The Texas Good Samaritan statute,8 9 which is representative of most of
the statutes that protect laymen and medical personnel, provides:
No person shall be liable in civil damages who administers emergency
care in good faith at the scene of an emergency for acts performed
during the emergency unless such acts are wilfuly or wantonly negli-
problem of medical malpractice in the United States had only "heard" of one such case in a
trial court, and, furthermore, the commission had no information about out-of-court settle-
ments arising out of emergency care. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 15 (1973); Note, Risks of the Good
Samaritan, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 613 (1973). Apparently, injured or ill persons who receive
assistance do not sue those who have assisted them. The second problem is that the psychology
of responding to persons in peril is quite complicated; thus, a statutory approach is not likely to
affect responses one way or the other. See, e.g., Latane & Darley, Group Inhibition of
Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 215 (1968); Piliavin,
Piliavin & Rodin, Good Samaritanism: An Underground Phenomenon?, 13 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 289 (1969).
83. The first Good Samaritan statute was adopted in California in 1959. The catalyst for this
statute is traceable to an incident where physicians left an injured woman unattended on a ski
slope. Note, California Good Samaritan Legislation: Exemptions from Civil Liability While
Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 818 (1963).
84. See Weigel, supra note 79, at 138.
85. In 1969 thirty-seven states had Good Samaritan statutes, twenty-four of which protect-
ed only physicians and other licensed medical personnel. See Note, supra note 19, at 677-78.
Now there are fifty-one Good Samaritan statutes, of which twenty protect only physicans and
other licensed medical personnel. See note 86 infra.
86. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121(1) (Supp. 1973); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2144, 2727.5 (West
Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-108 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-5766 (1975);
D.C. CODE § 2-142 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 2a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. §
65-2891 (Supp. 1976); KY. REV. STAT. § 411.148 (Supp. 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1731-
:1732 (West 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 132 (Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12B
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1501 (1968), § 41.711 a (Supp. 1977);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152 (1975), § 37-107 (Supp.
1974); N.Y.EDuC. LAW § 6527 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1975-76); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-17-
37, -38 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.12, §§ 1641-1643 (Pardon Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-37-14 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-23 (1974); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 441.06, 448.06 (West
1974).
87. ALAS. STAT. § 09.65.090 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1471 (West Supp. 1975);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 6801 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-930 (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-1.5
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12-1 (Burns 1973), § 34-
4-12-2 (Burns Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.17 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 164 (West Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 190.195 (Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-410 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
41.500, .505 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.12 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-I (West
Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-25-3, -4 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (West 1976); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 30.800 (1975); S.C. CODE § 46-803 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. la
(Vernon 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); VA. CODE § 54-276.9 (Supp. 1976); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (1976); WYO. STAT. § 33-343.1
(Supp. 1975).
88. With approximately 40% of the jurisdictions protecting only physicians, the usefulness
to carriers of Good Samaritan statutes is immediately suspect.
89. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. [a (Vernon 1969).
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gent; provided that nothing herein shall apply to the administering of
such care where the same is rendered for remuneration or with the
expectation of remuneration or is rendered by any person or agent of a
principal who was at the scene of the accident or emergency because he
or his principal was soliciting business or seeking to perform such
services for remuneration. a°
Several points particularly relevant to carriers should be noted. First, the
statute makes no distinction between voluntary aid rendered by a bystander
and aid rendered by a person under an antecedent legal duty to aid.9
Secondly, the statute requires that emergency care must not be rendered for
remuneration. 92 Thirdly, the care rendered must be emergency care. 93 The
definition of an emergency to a carrier employee may be less than clear.
Finally, the care must be rendered at the scene of an accident or emer-
gency.94 Before analyzing the implications to carriers of such statutory
language, it must be noted that case law interpreting Good Samaritan stat-
utes is scarce. 95
Antecedent Duty to Aid. The Texas Good Samaritan statute and other
similar statutes do not directly address the issue of the statute's applicability
when the one rendering aid is under an antecedent duty to so do. 96 Addres-
sing this issue in Lee v. State,97 however, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the Alaska Good Samaritan statute 98 is inapplicable when a duty to
rescue pre-exists a rescue attempt. In Lee a state trooper accidentally shot a
person whom he was attempting to rescue from a lion. In the negligence
action the court did not allow the trooper to use the Good Samaritan statute
as a defense against his negligent firing. The court found that the purpose of
the Good Samaritan statute is to encourage voluntary rescue by removing
90. Id.
91. See notes 96-104 infra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 105-14 infra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text.
95. Dahl v. Turner, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458
P.2d 860 (1969). For further general discussion see cases cited in Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 222
(1971). No case has been reported where a person has been sued for rendering first aid. See note
82 supra. Besides Dahl v. Turner, only one other case has been reported in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia in which a Good Samaritan statute was construed. See Lee v. State,
490 P.2d 1206 (Alas. 1971).
96. The Vermont Good Samaritan statute, however, imposes an affirmative duty on all
persons to render aid to those exposed to grave physical harm. Those persons rendering aid are
protected from liability for ordinary negligence, but those who do not aid are subject to a fine.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). See also Note, Good Samaritan Not Liable for Negligent
Emergency Care Unless Willfully or Wantonly Negligent, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 909, 914 (1962).
97. 490 P.2d 1206 (Alas. 1971).
98. The Alaska statute is similar to the Texas statute in that antecedent duty is not
mentioned, the care must be in an emergency, and the care may not be for compensation:(a) A person who, without expecting compensation, renders care to an injured
or sick person, or gives counseling or advice to a person in a condition of
emotional crisis, who appears to be in an immediate need of aid is not liable for
civil damages as a result of an act or omission in rendering emergency care,
counseling or advice or as a result of an act or failure to act to provide or arrange
for further medical treatment or care for the injured person or further counsel-
ing or care for the person in a condition of emotional crisis.
(b) This section shall not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of gross
negligence or intentional misconduct. Gross negligence means reckless, wilful,
or wanton misconduct.
ALAS. STAT. § 09.65.090 (1973).
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the threat of liability. A person under a pre-existing duty needs no added
inducement, and, thus, such persons do not fall within the purview of the
purpose of the statute. 9 The court found that an obligation to care for the
plaintiff arose out of the customary role played by police officers in
emergencies. mo
Although the Alaska case is the only one to hold that Good Samaritan
statutes apply only in the absence of a pre-existing duty, the Alaska statute
is quite similar to those of other states, and similar construction would not
be surorising. For example, the Alaska statute reauires the person to render
aid "without expecting compensation" before the statute's protection will
apply.' Similarly, twenty-four other statutes require aid to be rendered
"gratuitously" or "without compensation."'0 2 Only six statutes do not
require the aid to be voluntary aid.0 3
If the states which require aid to be gratuitous follow the Alaska court's
analysis, then persons who are rendering aid under a pre-existing duty will
not be within the statutes' purview. Although neither the relation between
carrier and passenger, nor the contract, nor a statute has ever been held to
create a pre-existing duty to render first aid,1°4 courts in the future might
impose such a duty under any of the three theories. If a pre-existing duty to
render first aid were found to arise from the relation, the contract, or a
statute, the carrier would not be protected by Good Samaritan statutes,
assuming the Alaska court's analysis is followed. With the several potential
sources of pre-existing duty and the traditional "high degree of care"
required from carriers, the duty question alone is enough to dissuade car-
riers from relying on Good Samaritan statutes. Additional problems with the
statutes exist which should also give carriers second thoughts about training
employees to render first aid.
Emergency Care. Under Good Samaritan statutes a person must render
"emergency" care to assume the role of a Good Samaritan. While a few are
more explicit, many states do not define emergency in their Good Samaritan
statutes. For example, New Mexico defines emergency as "an unexpected
occurrence involving injury or illness to persons, including motor vehicle
accidents and collisions, disasters, and other accidents and events of similar
nature occurring in public or private places." 0 5 Oklahoma permits a layman
to provide only limited emergency care: artificial respiration, prevention of
99. 490 P.2d at 1209 & n.7.
100. Id. at 1209-10, citing Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484 (1964).
101. See note 98 supra.
102. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maine (addi-
tionally requires the aid to be "voluntary"), Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma ("no prior contractual relation"), Oregon (additionally requires the aid to be
"voluntary"), South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont (an affirmative duty to act, but
cannot receive remuneration to be protected from liability for negligence), Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See note 87 supra.
103. Idaho, Minnesota (but the statute requires reasonable care which would seem to negate
totally the usefulness of the statute), Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Dakota.
See note 87 supra.
104. See notes 31-77 supra and accompanying text.
105. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-25-4 (1976).
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blood loss, or restoration of heart or blood circulation."06 Oregon limits care
to "emergency circumstances that suggest that giving of assistance is the
only alternative to death or serious physical after effects."10 7 Thus, whether
or not the situation is an emergency is a key factor in determining if a Good
Samaritan statute applies. Since most states have not defined emergency,
however, resort to case law in each state is necessary to find applicable
definitions. In Texas, for example, an emergency has been defined to mean
a "condition arising suddenly or unexpectedly and not proximately caused
by any negligent act of the person in question, and which calls for immediate
action on his part without time for deliberation.' '0 8
Whether emergency is defined by statute or by case law, emergency will
be a question of fact for a jury applying the standard of a reasonable man
acting in the particular situation rather than the subjective standard of any
particular carrier employee who decides to render first aid.1°9 If a carrier
employee renders first aid negligently and the jury finds there was no
emergency, then the carrier will be liable for ordinary negligence. 10 The
courts, however, have offered some relief to persons who act in an emergen-
cy by not requiring the actor to make the best or most reasonable choice
among alternative courses of action. 1' This relief would be particularly
important to a carrier employee such as a bus driver who may be held to
simultaneous and mutually exclusive duties to secure medical aid and to
render first aid to an ill passenger."12 The driver is not required by a court to
make the "better" choice in an emergency.
The importance of acting only in an emergency is indicated by Dahl v.
Turner."3 In that case defendant aided plaintiff, who had been slightly
injured in an automobile accident, by driving him to a motel. En route,
defendant was involved in an automobile accident. Plaintiff sued. The court,
holding that defendant was not rendering emergency care to plaintiff, found
the Good Samaritan statute inapplicable as a defense. The implication this
case has for carrier first-aid training programs is significant because the
employees must be trained to be extremely sensitive to whether or not a
situation is an emergency. Without unambiguous definitions of an emergen-
cy and cases as precedent, the training will be a difficult task and must be
oriented to each particular state law. 4
106. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (West 1976).
107. ORE. REV. STAT. 6 30.900 (1975).
108. Goolsbee v. Tex. & N.O.R.R., 150 Tex. 528, 532, 243 S.W.2d 386, 388 (1951).
109. See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 80, 21.318.
110. This situation exists, notwithstanding any pre-existing duty problem.
I1l. See, e.g., Del Bosque v. Heitman Bering-Cortes Co., 474 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1971);
Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971); Evans, The Standard of Care in Emergen-
cies, 31 Ky. L.J. 207 (1943); Note, The Effect of An "Emergency" in the Requirement of
Ordinary Care in the Law of Negligence, 9 NOTRE DAME LAW. 244 (1934); Note, Acting in
Emergency, 27 YALE L.J. 959 (1918).
112. An interesting predicament could occur when a passenger gets sick in a bus or taxi. The
cases concerned with the relation between a carrier and its passengers hold that a carrier is
under a duty to secure medical aid for an ill passenger. See notes 31-57 supra and accompany-
ing text. If, however, a court found that a driver trained in first aid also had a duty to render
first aid to an ill passenger, which duty would prevail? The sole bus driver would be confronted
simultaneously with two conflicting duties.
113. 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d 860 (1969).
114. See, e.g., notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text for language of the New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Oregon statutes.
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Scene of an Emergency. A third statutory element which makes Good
Samaritan statutes less than useful to carriers is the varying definition of
"scene of an emergency." Most statutes leave the physical place of the
emergency wholly unrestricted by allowing emergency care "at the scene of
an emergency" or "at the scene of an emergency or accident." Five states,
however, use the phrase "at the scene of an accident" rather than the term
emergency: Idaho," 5 Indiana,'16 North Carolina,'17 Tennessee,"18 and West
Virginia." 9 As used in these five states, the term "accident" is not defined.
As no case constructions of the phrases are available, a determination of
whether the term "accident" would include sudden illness to passengers is
not possible. If not so included, then the thirty-one Good Samaritan statutes
applicable to carriers may, for all practical purposes, be reduced to twenty-
six. Thus, even if the pre-existing duty and emergency definition problems
are overcome-only one-half of the states provide potential protection from
negligence liability to carrier employees who render first aid.
Constitutionality. A final problem in relying on Good Samaritan statutes
by carriers which are contemplating first aid training programs for their
employees is that some state constitutions require that every person be
entitled to a legal remedy for all injuries or wrongs inflicted upon his person,
property, or character.2 0 Although no Good Samaritan statute has been
constitutionally challenged, a total abrogation of common law rights of
action in some states may be unconstitutional. 121
On the other hand, statutes which eliminate liability for ordinary negli-
gence, but do not restrict liability for higher degrees of misconduct, have
been upheld as only restrictions of remedies, rather than total abrogations . 2
The upholding of statutes which restrict liability should be compared to the
striking down of statutes which are total abrogations of remedies such as an
abrogation of the remedy for alienation of affections2 3 and an abrogation of
municipal liability for injuries suffered on streets and sidewalks. 24
Analyzing Good Samaritan statutes applicable to "any person" shows
that twenty-one statutes preclude immunity when there has been gross
negligence or wilful or wanton conduct. 25 Of the remaining ten statutes,
nine require "good faith" in rendering aid, 26 and the remaining statute
115. IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (Supp. 1976) ("at the scene of an accident").
116. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12-1 (Burns 1973) ("at the scene of an accident or emergency
care to the victim thereof").
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (975) ("at the scene of a motor vehicle accident").
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622 (Supp. 1975) ("at the scene of an accident and/or disaster").
119. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (Supp. 1975) ("at the scene of an accident").
120. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9.
121. See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 80, 21.36; Note, North Carolina's
"Good Samaritan" Statute, 44 N.C.L. REv. 508 (1966).
122. See, e.g., Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S.W.2d 326 (1957).
123. Heck v. Schupp, 394 I1. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
124. Lebohm v. Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
125. Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. See note 87 supra.
126. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. See note 87 supra.
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requires a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. 2 7 In terms
of definitions, again the statutes are found wanting. Gross negligence is
generally something less than a reckless disregard and differs from negli-
gence in degree only, but not kind. 2 ' On the other hand, the existence of
wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct usually indicates the actor has intention-
ally done an unreasonable act in disregard of a known risk or a risk that was
so obvious it should have been known. 129 Good faith, on the other hand,
defies definition as courts have given it both a subjective and objective
meaning. 130
Regardless of the definitional problems and the variations in statutory
language, Good Samaritan statutes do not appear to be complete abrogations
of remedies for harm to persons. Some type of conduct is apparently outside
the protection of each of the statutes. Thus, of the shortcomings mentioned,
the constitutionality of Good Samaritan statutes is the least of the troubles
likely to be faced by a carrier that attempts to rely on them for protection
from liability in rendering first aid negligently to ill passengers.
Given the facts that (1) twenty Good Samaritan statutes protect physi-
cians only, (2) much of the language of the statutes is ambiguous, and (3)
there is a high probability that a carrier, despite a lack of authority, will be
found to have a duty to render first aid, thus making the statute inapplicable
vis-A-vis the thinking of the Alaska Supreme Court, a second mechanism
must be explored to determine whether carriers may train their personnel to
render first aid without undue fear of liability.
B. Antecedent Releases from Liability
Generally. A second mechanism to exempt13 ' carriers from liability for
ordinary negligence in rendering first aid is the execution of an antecedent
release from liability in the form of either statements on the ticket signed by
the passenger before boarding the vehicle or a contract separate from the
ticket, also signed before boarding. The validity of these two forms of
contractual provisions is the issue to be discussed below.
The majority rule of law in the United States, which is also the common
law rule, is that no contract, condition, or limitation will release a carrier
from liability to a full-fare passenger for consequences of negligence on the
part of the carrier or its employees. 3 2 The rule is grounded in public policy:
first, the courts believe that passengers and carrier are not on equal footing
127. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (1975).
128. See W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at 183.
129. Id. at 185.
130. See, e.g., Siano v. Helvering, 13 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 1936). See also Note, supra
note 83, at 819.
131. This Comment is not concerned with the feasibility of liability limitation to certain
damage amounts. Rather, the issue addressed is the feasibility of a complete exemption or
exculpation from negligence liability. See Note, Contractual Limitation of Liability for Negli-
gence, 6 J. AIR LAW 284 (1935).
132. The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 575(l)(b) (1932) says:
(1) . . . a bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of negli-
gence is illegal if . . . (b) one of the parties is charged with a duty of public
service, and the bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part of
its duty to the public, for which it has received or been promised compensation.
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in terms of bargaining power; 33 and secondly, there is a fear that any release
from liability might encourage a carrier to relax its diligence in caring for the
passengers' safety. 134 The attitude of most courts toward carrier exemptions
from liability is summed up by the Supreme Court's terse conclusions in
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood:13
First. That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption
from responsibility when such exemption is not just and reasonable in
the eyes of the law.
Secondly. That it is not just and reasonable in the eyes of the law for a
common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for negli-
gence of himself or his servants.
Thirdly. That these rules apply both to carriers of goods and carriers of
passengers for hire, and with a special force to the latter.
36
Whether carrier exemption from liability in rendering first aid is "just and
reasonable" has not been addressed by any court.
Interpretation of this common law nonexemption rule and its application
to carrier first-aid training programs is complicated by several factors. First,
the general rule has developed in cases dealing with particular legal distinc-
tions and fact situations which are not directly relevant to the first-aid
problem. 13 7 For example, most of the cases concerning the release of car-
riers from liability have dealt with either free passes in exchange for a
release' or the distinction between common and private carriers. 3 9 Sec-
ondly, most of the case law is old and developed in the context of railroad
litigation. 140 The rules developed for railroads, however, are probably appli-
cable to all carriers as the courts, in the past, have applied these rules to
other carriers.' 4' Thirdly, a carrier's negligence with respect to a paying
passenger is controlled by state law when the carrier is a railroad, bus
company, 42 or non-international air carrier.143 Federal law, however, con-
133. See Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Texas Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 181 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir.
1950) (no public interest where bargaining is at arm's length); Rittenberg, Limitation of Airline
Passenger Liability, 6 J. AIR LAW 365, 377-78 (1935); Note, Contractual Exculpation from Tort
Liability in California-The "True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 350 (1964).
134. See, e.g., N.Y.C.R.R. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 377-79 (1873) (person
riding on free pass defined to be passenger for hire; release invalid as matter of law); Herzog,
Validity of Contracts Exempting Carriers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce From Liability,
II SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (1960).
135. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
136. Id. at 384.
137. Surprisingly, very little litigation has arisen on the issue of exempting carriers from
liability to full-fare passengers. See Herzog, supra note 134, at 179. For a rare case involving
exemptions and a full-fare passenger, see Horelick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 13 N.J. 349, 99 A.2d
652 (1953).
138. Grand Trunk R.R. v. Stevens, 95 U.S. 655 (1878); Martin v. Greyhound Corp., 277 F.2d
501 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1013 (1956); Walther v. Southern Pac. Co., 159 Cal.
769, 116 P. 51 (1911); Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N.E. 539 (1918). The
Interstate Commerce Act now controls the issuance of free passes for railroads. 49 U.S.C. §
1(7) (1970).
139. Common carriers generally cannot be released from liability whereas private carriers
(contractors) may be. Unlike the public carrier, the private carrier must compete with numerous
other carriers for contract business, thus the courts believe that bargaining power is equal.
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kent, 136 Ind. A pp. 551, 198 N.E.2d 615 (1964); Vandalia R.R. v. Stevens,
67 Ind. App. 238, 114 N.E. 1001 (1917).
140. See Rittenberg, supra note 133, at 365.
141. Id.
142. See Herzog, supra note 134, at 189.
143. Id. at 192, 195-99.
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trols contracts for transportation of passengers on ships.144
Releases in Texas. Consistent with the majority rule in the United States,
the rule in Texas provides that "a railroad company cannot, in any case
where it undertakes to carry a person, exempt itself by contract from
liability to that person for damages occasioned by the negligence of itself or
servants.' ' 45 This rule for railroads is simply the common law rule that a
carrier cannot stipulate for exemptions from liability for negligence.'" By
statute, Texas has applied the common law to all carriers 47 and has desig-
nated which carriers are to be defined as common carriers. 48 Texas has gone
one step further by expressly prohibiting the restriction of a carrier's com-
mon law liability. 14
9
The critical question in Texas, then, is whether the broad rule of nonex-
emption applies to first-aid services. Although there are no cases on point,
an examination of related cases indicates the stance that probably would be
taken by Texas courts toward releases from liability for negligence in ren-
dering first aid. In G., C. & S.F. Ry. v. McGown, 5° although the plaintiff-
passenger was riding on a free pass, the court undertook an analysis of the
relation between passengers and carriers in general. The court said:
[R]ules have been established, by statute or the common law, whereby
certain duties have been attached to given relations and employments.
These duties attach as a matter of law, and without regard to the will or
wish of the party engaged in the employment, or of the person who
transacts business with him, in the course thereof; and this is so for the
public good. Duties thus imposed are not the subject of contract. They
exist without it, and cannot be dispensed by it.'
51
The court, applying a duty which arose outside the contract, held the carrier
liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff in a derailment, notwithstanding the
fact that the pass given to plaintiff released the carrier from liability for
negligence and had been signed by plaintiff.
A later case, consistent with McGown, has indicated in broad language
that a carrier's right to restrict its liability for negligence does not extend to
matters that are "within the scope of its business" as a common carrier.'
5 2
144. Id at 189.
145. Ft. Worth & D.C.R.R. v. Rogers, 53 S.W. 366, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ)
(release signed by passenger on freight train invalid as matter of law; although railroad was not
required to carry passengers on freight trains, once passenger was accepted, his status as
passenger prevented release of carrier from liability).
146. Id. at 368.
147. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 882 (Vernon 1964): "The duties and liabilities of
carriers in this State and the remedies against them, shall be the same as those prescribed by the
common law except where otherwise provided by this title."
148. See, e.g., id. art. 91 la, § 2 (bus companies are defined to be common carriers).
149. Id. art. 883 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) (emphasis added):
Railroad companies, and other carriers of passengers. . . within this state...
shall not limit or restrict their liability as it exists at common law, by general or
special notice, or by inserting exceptions in the bill of lading or memorandum
given upon the receipt of the goods for transportation or in any other manner
whatsoever . . ..
150. 65 Tex. 640 (1886).
151. Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
152. International-Great N.R.R. v. Lucas, 70 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 128 Tex. .332, 99 S.W.2d 297 (1936) (contractor
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The scope of business of a common carrier is to carry passengers and
property for hire.'53 Although the scope of business cases deal with the
distinction between common and private carriers, these cases are important
in that, pursuant to McGown, if a carrier is found to be a common carrier,
then a release of liability for negligence in the operation of a vehicle is void
as against public policy.
Texas cases dealing with "free passes" for travel on railroads 5 4 consti-
tute another line of cases which has dealt with the validity of releases
exempting the carrier from liability. Before federal law applied to free
passes on railroads, Texas courts held that a common carrier could not be
released from liability for negligence whether a passenger was for hire or
was riding on a free pass.' Again, the negligence involved the duty to
operate the vehicle safely, a duty imposed by law which must be carried out
with the highest degree of care. ,56
First Aid and Releases. The McGown case stands for the proposition that
a carrier cannot exempt itself from liability if "certain duties" are imposed
by public policy. As discussed previously, the duties so imposed seem to
involve safety in the transportation' and the ingress or egress of the
passengers. 58 It has already been shown that no case has ever held a carrier
under a duty to render first aid to passengers, although there is a duty to
secure medical aid and to comfort. If rendering first aid is not a "certain
duty" of a carrier, then language in McGown indicates that a carrier can
contract against liability.159 The only impediments to a release or exemption
are those duties imposed by public policy; 16 such duties are independent of
any contract' 6' and, thus, cannot be the subject of a contract of exemption.
An action based upon their violation sounds in tort and not in contract. 62
In the last analysis, we must return to the "just and reasonable" language
of the Lockwood case. 63 For a carrier to abdicate the "essential duties of
his employment" is not just and reasonable.161 This Comment suggests that
rendering first aid is not an essential duty of a carrier. The two best
working for railroad was a passenger for hire, and, consequently, release of carrier from
liability for negligence in collision was invalid).
153. Id.
154. The use of free passes on railroads is now subject to federal law under the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(7) (1970).
155. See, e.g., Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Watson, 135 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911), rev'd, 106 Tex. 4, 155 S.W. 179 (1913) (held that carrier was not common carrier;
therefore, release on pass was valid).
156. See notes 25-28 supra.
157. See note 26 supra,
158. See note 27 supra. See also Horelick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 13 N.J. 349, 99 A.2d 652
(1953).
159. The duties imposed by law were held not to be the subject of contract. 65 Tex. at 646.
But, by implication, duties not imposed by law could be the subject of contract. A carrier may
not avoid the "essential duties of his employment." Id. at 647.
160. As indicated in Santa Fe P. & P.R.R. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 185
(1913) (involving exemption of carrier from liability for property damage), the rule against
exemption has no place when a carrier is not performing its duty as a common carrier.
161. Harris v. Howe, 74 Tex. 534, 537, 12 S.W. 224, 225 (1889).
162. Vandalia R.R. v. Stevens, 67 Ind. App. 238, 114 N.E. 1001, 1005 (1917). See also notes
31-35 supra.
163. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
164. 83 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 381.
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indicators for this proposition are that no court has held first aid to be a
duty, essential or otherwise, and that the carrier is only under a duty of
reasonable care to secure medical aid and comfort for an ill passenger,
rather than a duty to use the highest degree of care normally associated with
carrier activities. 165 Without an essential duty, releases should be valid.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the viewpoint of liability, common carriers, with the exception of
airlines, should not train their employees to render first-aid services to
passengers who become ill. The risk of liability to the carrier thus acting
outside its scope of expertise would be high. This liability risk could not be
ameliorated by two mechanisms available to the average layman who makes
a good faith, albeit negligent, attempt to aid a person in peril. Both Good
Samaritan statutes and releases from liability are apparently not available to
those already under the duty to give aid. The "highest degree of care"
requirement, although limited to the duty to operate the vehicle safely, is
pervasive in the cases and statutes and would likely influence many courts
to find a duty to render first aid once a carrier employee is so trained.
Therefore, reliance by a carrier upon Good Samaritan protection or releases
from liability would be uncertain at best.
On the other hand, the total absence of appellate cases involving first aid
rendered negligently, either by doctors or laymen, indicates either a tenden-
cy of people not to sue Good Samaritans or a tendency of juries not to find
negligence on the part of those who go to the aid of others. When these facts
are coupled with the availability of insurance, the good will and advertising
advantages of first aid programs could well outweigh any negative aspects of
potential negligence liability.
Finally, the rapid and recent adoption of Good Samaritan statutes protect-
ing "any person," not only doctors, seems to indicate that legislatures are
willing to expand the protection provided by these statutes. Carriers should
lobby for a change in the existing statutes, because clearly defined statutory
protection can eliminate the unpredictability inherent in court-defined
"duties" of the common carrier. Until the extent of the duties is known, a
carrier cannot rely on either Good Samaritan statutes or releases to protect
itself from liability in rendering first aid negligently.
165. See note 25 supra.
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